The IDF published this evening (Thursday) the findings of the comprehensive investigation conducted into the conduct of the security forces during the terrible massacre at the Nuba party, near Kibbutz Re'im, on October 7.
The massacre, in which 378 civilians, security forces personnel and staff were murdered, and 44 people were kidnapped - 11 of whom were murdered in captivity, paints a stark picture of systemic failures in the IDF, especially in the Gaza Division and the Northern Brigade.
Despite this, the investigation - headed by Brigadier General (res.) Ido Mizrahi - praises the heroism and performance of police officers, party organizers, civilians, and a small force of Givati and IPS officers who arrived late and fought the terrorists.
The investigation particularly praised the quick decision of Ofakim Police Chief, Lt. Col. Nivi Ohana, to disperse the party immediately after the shooting began at 6:29 AM. According to the findings, this decision saved the lives of thousands of partygoers and prevented an even greater disaster.
A surprising point that emerges from the investigation is that the Hamas terrorist organization did not plan to come to the Nuba party at all. The terrorists, who were on their way to Netivot, took a wrong turn at the Shokda intersection and unintentionally arrived at the Re'im parking lot, where the mass party was taking place.
The investigation describes the course of the massacre, the systemic failures, and the heroic acts of various elements. Despite the rapid dispersal of the party by the police commander, terrorists quickly reached key points and attacked the fleeing revelers. An early report from the Home Front Command to the Northern Brigade General Staff that most of the revelers had left the compound caused the army to lower its level of attention to what was happening at the scene.
The investigation also pointed to an error in judgment by a combat helicopter pilot who did not attack a terrorist convoy due to uncertainty about identification.
The investigation determined that the Northern Brigade and the Gaza Division did not have an accurate picture of what was happening at the party, and that the army was cut off from contact with the police and did not act to obtain information. The first report about the event reached the Operations Brigade at the General Staff only after 10:00 AM. The investigation pointed to a long series of failures at the level of the Northern Brigade, the Gaza Division, and the Southern Command, which led to the failure to prevent the serious disaster.
Basic data:
• 378 Israelis were murdered at the Nuba party - 344 of them civilians, and 34 members of the security forces (some were part of the party's cheerleaders and some fell in battle).
• 44 Israelis from the Nuba camp were kidnapped to Gaza (not all were kidnapped from the Nuba compound itself) - 27 of them returned to Israel (14 alive and 13 whose bodies were recovered), 17 are still in captivity (11 alive, 6 dead).
• In total, including the hostages who were murdered in captivity - there were 397 murdered at the Nova party.
• In the Nova Party area, 171 Israelis were murdered, and 16 were kidnapped.
• All other murdered and kidnapped people in the Nuba - 207 murdered and 28 kidnapped - were murdered or kidnapped on the roads, on the perimeter roads, in settlements or in other fighting centers.
• The map of the Nuwa casualties extends over 52 km in the Gaza Envelope - from the Shaar Negev junction area to Nir Yitzhak.
The findings and main points of the investigation, as summarized by Doron Kadosh, the military correspondent for the Israeli Military News Agency:
• The security team for the Nova party included 31 armed police officers, and another 75 unarmed security guards. In other words: less than 30% of the party's security team was armed, and even those who were armed - only with pistols, which are not particularly effective in a terrorist attack. IDF soldiers were not in the party's security at all.
• After the party organizers submitted a permit application to the police, the Ofakim Police Station held two planning approval hearings. Both times, IDF representatives were not present, contrary to custom, because they "could not come.".
• The commander of the Northern Brigade, Col. Haim Cohen, initially refused to approve the party on Saturday, and only wanted to approve a party that took place the day before, on Friday. The reason, he said, was because the scope of the SDAK in the sector is reduced on weekends and holidays, and due to the operational workload during those days following the fence demonstrations.
At this point, a system of pressures begins to act on the brigade commander from more senior sources - in the division and the command, until he is ultimately forced to approve the party. In the IDF investigation, the pressures in question are legitimately presented as "inter-level dialogue" that is conducted in a standard and reasonable manner. The investigation removes responsibility from the Southern Command's Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Manor Yanai, and the command's AGM officer, Colonel Ephraim Avni, even though both were certainly involved in the decision to ultimately approve the party.
• The investigation severely criticizes the commander of the Northern Brigade in the Gaza Division, who did not carry out an orderly and proper military preparation process in preparation for the party, after it was already decided on Wednesday to approve it (the decision, incidentally, was conveyed via WhatsApp without the brigade commander's signature, but with verbal approval).
There was no organized situation assessment in the brigade prior to the party, no change was made to the scope of the security forces in the sector following the party, the fact that the party was taking place was not conveyed to the sectoral forces in the field, no IDF representative was stationed in the police headquarters at the party site, and no military force was stationed at or near the party site. Serious malfunctions were found in the coordination between the IDF and the Israel Police during the event.
• During the night of October 6-7, in the early assessments of the situation due to the intelligence signals that arrived - the issue of the Nova party did not arise. No change was made to the deployment of forces around the party, and the issue was not raised for discussion.
• Immediately upon the beginning of the Hamas attack - at 6:35, the commander of the police force at the party, Lieutenant Colonel Nivi Ohana, decides to disperse the party immediately. The investigation notes this decision as a decision that saved the lives of thousands of partygoers, who managed to evacuate the party complex during the first hours, some of whom evacuated via the main roads - 232 - and were murdered or kidnapped along the way, and some via bypass roads who managed to escape. The vast majority of those who were not at the Nuba party - about 3,000 people - were saved and fled at an early stage.
• The investigation states that Hamas did not know in advance about the Nuba party and did not send a dedicated terrorist force to attack the party premises. The first terrorists to arrive in the area were terrorists who were intended in their plans to reach the city of Netivot. But they got confused on the way, continued on Highway 232, and arrived by chance at 8:12 near the party complex.
The terrorists, a force of about a hundred terrorists in 14 vans and 2 motorcycles equipped with heavy weapons, saw the police checkpoint that had opened at the scene and was evacuating people through an escape route - and began to attack it.
• At this point, starting at 8:13, an exchange of fire begins between the terrorists and the armed police and security forces who were on site. The terrorists launched RPG rockets and opened heavy fire. At this point, most of the partygoers had already managed to escape by car or on foot, but not everyone had yet evacuated the scene, and therefore a mass escape of partygoers began in all directions - some eastward to the evacuation routes, where many managed to save themselves, but the terrorists also arrived there and murdered many.
Some of the escapees fled on Highway 232, and from there the terrorists also managed to kidnap seven people at 8:43, including those who are still in captivity - Maxim Harkin, Eviatar David, Guy Gilboa Dellal, Bar Kuperstein and Elkana Buchbot. There were also many partygoers who fled back to the party complex - into the forest, because they thought it was safer there.
• At 9:19 AM, the terrorists raided the party complex itself. There, hundreds of partygoers had fled the scene and tried to hide in various places - among the vehicles, in the yellow toilets, in the garbage containers, in the bar areas, on the main stage, and in the camping area. At this point, after about an hour of fighting, there were no more armed men left at the scene because everyone had been killed or wounded in the fighting - and no military force had yet arrived.
The terrorists entered the party complex without a fight, and began a brutal, mass massacre and execution of everyone they managed to capture. For 40-50 minutes, they searched the entire complex and shot in all directions, murdering more than 120 men and women there. For an unclear reason, the terrorists decided to leave the bodies in the complex - and did not kidnap anyone at that stage, but from the investigation it can be understood that if the terrorists had chosen to carry out kidnappings there as well - they would have managed to kidnap many more, alive or dead, if only they had chosen to do so.
• At 9:51 AM, the terrorists finish the mass massacre at the party complex. Some return to the Gaza Strip, and some receive further orders to travel to Bari and join the fighting there. At 10:27 AM, a crowd of Gazans arrives at the party complex and carries out their plan.
Only at 11:30, long after the mass massacre in the compound had ended and the terrorists had mostly left, except for a few who remained, did the first military force under the command of Major General Shaked arrive at the compound. The force eliminated several terrorists on its way, searched the entire compound, and located the many bodies of the murdered. At 1:00 PM, the searches were completed and operational control of the compound was achieved. By 5:00 AM the next morning, all of the casualties would be evacuated from the site.
Join the Haredim 10 Facebook page >>
Join the X page of Haredim 10 >>
Want more news, videos and stories? Join the Haredim 10 WhatsApp channel >>
