Iranian impersonated a Jew and recruited an Israeli woman of Persian descent for a spy network in Israel

January 12, 2022   

As part of a joint investigation by the General Security Service and the Lahav 433 Special Investigation Unit of the Israel Police, in recent weeks a suspicion was investigated that a number of Israeli citizens of Persian origin were recruited by Iranian intelligence elements to carry out missions within the State of Israel. 7 million American children who were vaccinated are not wrong: We got vaccinated and you should get vaccinated too Has it been three months since your second vaccination? This is how you will protect yourself from the virus Did you divide? For thousands of years we dreamed of Jerusalem, so now we want to dirty it? On Saturday: The mother rested, the child pulled the trigger – and was hospitalized in serious condition As part of the long-term monitoring of the suspects' activities and investigations, it emerged that they had ongoing contacts with an Iranian intelligence source. The investigations gathered a lot of evidence about these contacts, and accordingly, indictments were filed against some of the suspects. The Israeli citizens were contacted on Facebook by someone who posed as a Jew living in Iran to most of them, named "Rambod Namdar" - who infiltrated Facebook groups of Iranian immigrants, where he spoke to married women, mostly Persians who immigrated to Israel in the 1990s, and tried to gain their trust. He spoke about the longing he felt for Israel and asked for their phone numbers. When we gave him our permission and the conversation moved to WhatsApp, the messages also turned into video calls and compliments on their appearance. They could not imagine that the smiling, sensitive Jew who prayed at the "Abershmi" synagogue and talked to them was an Iranian agent who had set up a spy network that he operated from Tehran. He, for his part, refrained from revealing his face in video chats he had with them, claiming that his camera was broken. It should be emphasized that despite the suspects' suspicions that they were Iranian intelligence agents, some of them continued their contact with him, agreed to carry out tasks he assigned them, and received money from him. The names of those involved are prohibited from publication, by virtue of the court's decision and in accordance with a gag order issued at the request of the suspects' attorneys. The main parties involved: First suspect and her husband: One of the women being investigated in the case, a 40-year-old resident of Holon, who suspected that "Ramboud" was acting on behalf of the Iranian authorities and its intelligence agencies, had been in contact with him for several years. As part of this, the suspect carried out various tasks for the Iranian operator, including: 1. Secretly photographing the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. 2. Photographing inside the Ministry of the Interior in her city of residence, and photographing the National Insurance Office. 3. Passing on information about security arrangements and photographing a shopping mall in Holon. The investigation revealed that the suspect's husband was aware of her connections with "Ramboud", and even spoke with "Ramboud" himself, despite suspecting that he was an Iranian intelligence agent. The suspect even assisted his wife in carrying out one of her tasks for "Ramboud", by arranging to photograph the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. As part of the contact with "Ramboud", the suspect was asked to direct her son, who was about to be drafted into the IDF, to serve in the IDF Intelligence Branch, and in the process, and through her mediation, "Ramboud" spoke to the son by phone in order to get his opinion on his level of Persian (without the latter being aware of the context of the matter). It also emerged that the suspect was instructed by "Ramboud" to gather intelligence about senior figures in the defense establishment. Second suspect: Another detainee, who also emerged as part of the investigation, is a 57-year-old resident of Beit Shemesh, who was in contact with "Ramboud" for over four years, during which she performed various tasks at his request and received, on several occasions, a total sum of approximately $5,000. Actions carried out by the suspect as part of the operational connections, and at the request of "Rambod": 1. Attempt to direct her son to serve in the Intelligence Corps, transferring her son's military documentation (belt and badge) to the operator, as well as photographs and videos from a military ceremony from her son's enlistment. 2. Establishing a club of Iranian immigrants in Beit Shemesh, as part of the "Mirage Foundation" activity, and transferring the details of the Israelis active in the branch, photos and videos from the club's meetings, and photos of those participating in the activity. 3. Photographing the polling station, during the elections for the 23rd Knesset. 4. Attempting to photograph the American Embassy in Jerusalem, which was unsuccessful due to its being delayed by the local security guards. 5. Purchasing electronic devices and installing a hidden camera in a massage room in her home. 6. Was directed to get closer to a member of Knesset, took active steps to strengthen the relationship with the member of Knesset and transferred information about the relationship between them. 7. She was asked to perform additional tasks, such as buying a computer and a cell phone and opening a business. According to a report on Channel 12, the defendant told Rambaud that she worked for a municipality in central Israel and he asked her to take pictures of the mayor's office, the employees' meeting place, and other details from the archive - to which she was not given access, so she did not send pictures. Later, he asked her to work to open a club for the Foundation for Women Emigrants from Iran in the city. She did not withstand the pressure and the move was implemented, but Rambaud was not satisfied with this and asked her to take pictures of the list of women and send him their phone numbers. The defendant also told Rambaud about her son's enlistment in the IDF, and he in response tried to persuade him to enlist in the Navy, Air Force, or Intelligence through her. At one of his ceremonies in the army, she photographed the place and various objects and sent them to him. In December 2019, the defendant told the spy that she and her husband were planning to fly on vacation to Istanbul. She sent him the dates of the expected vacation and the name of the hotel, and Rambaud told her that he would try to get there, take items from her that she had purchased for him, and pay her for the work she had done for him. Before the flight, the defendant hid the items and books in Hebrew in the suitcases, so that her husband would not know about them. In December 2019, she flew with her husband to Istanbul and the day after landing, she received a message from a phone number she did not recognize. She was told that a sum of money was waiting for her in a crate of oranges in a fruit store near the hotel. A. went to the store and while she was looking for oranges, a young man approached her. who wore a scarf over part of his face, and handed her a small box with $3,000 in it. The two parted ways without exchanging a word. That day, she received a message: "Bring the belongings and books to the hotel entrance." A. left the hotel with two bags of books and belongings in her hands. The same young man she had met at the fruit store earlier arrived at the scene and took the belongings from her without exchanging a word with her. Back in Israel. Rambod was pleased with A.'s action and asked her to use the money she received to purchase electronic devices and a hidden camera. In 2020, during the election campaign for the 23rd Knesset, Rambod instructed the defendant to film the election process at the polling station. She asked why he needed it, but he insisted and instructed her to do as he said. During the conversations, she told him that she had previously known a Knesset member - Kati Sheetrit from the Likud, who is not a suspect in the matter - who served as head of the mayor's office in the center, and he asked her for the Her details. He directed her to approach the Knesset member, and she took active steps to strengthen the relationship with the Knesset member and provided information about their relationship, and more. In 2021, during the election campaign for the 24th Knesset, Rambaud instructed the defendant not to mess up and to photograph everything, including the inside of the polling station. She complied with his demands and sent him the photos. As their relationship continued, Rambaud ordered the defendant to photograph various places and events in Tel Aviv, starting from the Central Station and the parks adjacent to it, through police stations and ending with demonstrations by the LGBT community. He promised her and even sent her thousands of dollars for each photograph. Third suspect: A 47-year-old resident of Kfar Saba, who emerged during the investigation as having transferred money from "Rambod" to the second suspect on two separate occasions. The money was received through a relative of hers who came from Iran to visit Israel, and also as part of a meeting with a "Rambod" emissary in Turkey. Fourth suspect: A 50-year-old resident of Jerusalem, who was in contact with "Rambod" for about a year and a half until her arrest. As part of the contact, he transferred 1,240 Australian dollars to her, received various information from her, and asked her to participate with her in business and charity projects in Israel, which he would finance. Over the past month, the Jerusalem District Attorney's Office filed serious indictments against those involved with the Jerusalem District Court. A senior Shin Bet official: "This is a serious case, in which an intention to establish a spy network for Iran, which operated within the borders of the State of Israel, was exposed and thwarted. In this case, we are witnessing attempts at espionage within Israel, through an 'innocent' approach to Israeli women and their devolution into a long-term relationship. This is despite the suspects' suspicion that they were Iranian intelligence agents, and given their choice to continue the relationship with him and even carry out missions for him. In their serious actions, those involved endangered themselves, their family members, and innocent Israeli citizens, whose details were passed on to Iranian intelligence, in addition to information that was passed on about Israeli and American targets in Israel in a way that could be used for terrorist purposes. Iranian intelligence agents make extensive use of the Internet, and recently there has been an increase in the number of such contacts with Israeli citizens. This is for the purpose of collecting information that may assist Iran in its struggle against Israel, transmitting instructions for carrying out missions, and even 'attracting' Israelis abroad with the aim of harming them. The General Security Service will continue to thwart Iranian intelligence activity, including by monitoring its activity in cyberspace. We call on the citizens of the State of Israel to be vigilant for any unusual request or contact they receive in cyberspace, especially from elements identifying themselves as Iranians.".