Just over a week ago, the senior writer for "Yediot Aharonot" told us, in his characteristic know-it-all tone, that the ink in Abbas' pen is dry, that time after time Abbas runs away from difficult decisions, including in this round of negotiations. Barnea was able to say that in this round Netanyahu showed more flexibility than Abbas.
A basic rule in journalism is that you should attribute information to the source that gave it to you. Barnea never considered himself subject to this rule, and thus dug himself a hole.
In the middle of last week, Barnea wrote another article about the collapse of the negotiations, but this time in a completely opposite way. Again, in an omniscient tone, without attributing blame, he placed most of the responsibility for the failure on Netanyahu and his government, the construction in the settlements, and the lack of flexibility in positions. Barnea did not mention that just a few days earlier he had blamed everything on Abbas. Apparently, no one remembers anymore.
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Last Friday, it became clear how the turnaround happened. Barnea published things that an American senior official, whom we will call 'Martin' for convenience's sake, told him. Well, 'Martin' told Barnea (I'm guessing he told him this the day before the midweek article and that's what brought about the turnaround).
Here is an excerpt from what Barnea wrote on Friday:
''Martin' tells him: "What you claimed is not true, that Abu Mazen ran away from decisions. He didn't run away. He was simply disgusted.".
Tzipi Livni, I said, claimed after the explosion that Abbas did not move an inch from his known positions, while Netanyahu showed flexibility. "It is true that Netanyahu moved," they said ('Martin'). "But he did not move more than an inch and we had to invest a tremendous effort in it. When we tried to move Abbas, we did not succeed. As we said, he closed in, he locked himself in. I made a lot of concessions, he said."'
What concessions, I asked.
""He agreed to a demilitarized state, he agreed to draw the border so that 80 percent of the settlers would be in Israeli territory, he agreed that Israel would continue to hold security areas (referring mainly to the Jordan Valley – p.b.) for five years, after which the US would replace it... He also agreed that the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem would remain under Israeli sovereignty and agreed that the return of Palestinians to Israel would depend on the will of the Israeli government. Israel would not be flooded with refugees, he promised.""
Some notes:
1. Barnea writes that 'Martin' tells him: What you claimed is not true. Who claimed? My grandmother? Barnea claimed. Why doesn't he mention this to his readers? Confronting 'Martin's' claim?
2. Barnea writes that Tzipi Livni claimed after the explosion that Abbas did not budge from his positions. Ah, I mean, when Barnea wrote that as if the information fell from the sky, it actually came from Livni.
How many years has Barnea been a journalist? 250? Isn't it time to know that sources have interests? When Livni says that Netanyahu has shown flexibility, does that help her stay in the government? Livni must have spoken to Barnea off the record, but why can't Barnea write – here's the Israeli version of the negotiations exploding and then inserting Livni's words.
3. Barnea is responsible, along with Yair Lapid, Ari Shavit and their friends, for perpetuating the narrative that Abu Mazen blew up the talks, after, according to 'Martin', he made sweeping concessions. So on which side of the fence is there no partner? 'Martin' tells Barnea about a huge Palestinian concession, a practical concession on the right of return. Abu Mazen agreed in the talks that Israel would determine how many refugees would return and that Israel would not be flooded with refugees. Isn't that a headline? Isn't that flexibility on the part of Abu Mazen?
And one last word on the American side. In Martin Indyk's memoir, after the resounding failure of Camp David, Shepherdstown, and all the other things the American peace team did, Indyk lashed out, among other things, at the Americans' having attached too much importance to the coalition difficulties of the Israeli leaders.
According to 'Martin's' testimony, Barnea's lesson was not learned. In the interview, 'Martin' placed most of the blame for the failure on the intensive construction in the settlements during the negotiations.
He says, "The negotiations had to begin with a decision to freeze construction in the settlements. We thought that because of the composition of the current Israeli government, it was impossible to achieve that, so we gave up.".
There is one thing 'Martin' does not do in the fascinating briefing. He does not admit to the many embarrassing American mistakes during the negotiations. First, failed conduct, lack of synchronization, promises to one side that are unacceptable to the other side. Second, the formulation of a unilateral American paper based on the assumption that Abu Mazen can never say 'no', because he is too weak. Third, the lack of creativity in the negotiations. No new idea, no alternative plan in case, and the permanent settlement talks are not bearing fruit. Once again, the Americans came here to make peace, invested a lot of time, energy, thought and money, with all the best intentions in the world (really), but we ruined the deal.
Let's take comfort in the fact that 'Martin's' next memoir will probably be fascinating, no less than Martin Indyk's book.
