Ari Shavit wrote another of his wonderful theses, which are so well written, but not connected to the facts. Abu Mazen is a refusenik, he is waited for every time at a testing point and he is always defeated (the thesis reached its peak when he accused Abu Mazen of not going to sign the Geneva Agreement, as you remember, a non-governmental initiative by Yossi Beilin and Yass Abed Rabbo. According to Shavit's logic, the number 2 in the Palestinian Authority must sign sweeping concessions, from his perspective, and risk his political neck, to Yossi Beilin...).
Yair Lapid gave a heartbreaking speech in which he debates with us whether Abbas even wants a state. Again and again he evades, does not sign, does not go all the way. Lapid reached his climax when he wrote:
""About a year ago, we joined the government only after receiving a commitment that we would return to the peace negotiation table based on the principle of "two states for two peoples.""
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I wonder who he got a commitment from. It's not written in the basic outlines of the government he entered. It's not written in the deliberate intention (of Bennett) and of course Lapid didn't insist on it and it's doubtful he remembers it.
Nahum Barnea writes today about the ink that has dried up in Abbas' pen since 1993. He hasn't signed anything. You read and slowly go crazy. Intelligent, knowledgeable, experienced people, don't they know the facts, or do they have an interest in distorting them?
Abbas was never presented with a proposal that, in the reasonable view of someone familiar with the Palestinian arena, he was supposed to sign. Never. He may not have the strength to sign a permanent settlement, but that has never been tested. On the Israeli side, the leader was put to the test for 5 years and there is no doubt about it – he will not sign and will not sign.
The facts are tedious and worn-out, but the spin machine of Shavit-Barnea-Lapid-Livni and their friends is so annoying that they must be repeated.
Twenty-six years that Abu Mazen has been presenting the same price for a peace settlement. A Palestinian state on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital and an "agreed" solution to the refugee problem. That's the price. He hasn't moved a millimeter since 1988, it was like that in Oslo in 1993, in the permanent status talks that were opened with Ariel Sharon as foreign minister during Bibi's first term (who remembers? There was a meeting and a half like that), at Camp David in July 2000, in Taba in January 2011, in Annapolis in 2008 and with Netanyahu. The consistent Palestinian position has been that Israel will annex 2 to 4 percent of the West Bank and compensate them for every meter inside the Green Line. In the eyes of the Palestinians, this position is a huge concession in the face of the 1947 partition decision and their historical rights. You can agree, you can argue, but that's the price and it turns out they have no room to maneuver regarding it.
Generations of Israeli governments, who always knew better, tried to bite off the price. They thought it was a Middle Eastern bazaar. They say 100% of the territory occupied in 67, but they would settle for less. Barak drew a map of 50% in late 1999, Ramon said at one point that at 80% he knew how to close a deal with them, Peres said he knew about 90%, Barak proposed 92% at Camp David, Livni also went up to that number and Olmert reached 94%.
Lapid, Shavit, and Barnea are repeating the same stops at a time when Abbas allegedly got "cold feet." The Camp David Conference, for example, in July 2000.
So – Abu Mazen really played a negative role at Camp David. All sorts of petty political considerations (Arafat’s games between him and Abu Ala) led him to a passive and unwise position during the conference. However, I estimate, based on quite a few conversations, that the Israeli participants in the conference will admit to you today that there was no chance that Arafat or Abu Mazen would sign on to what Barak offered them there.
Barak made an amazing proposal, in terms of the mistaken expectations of Israeli public opinion at the time. He agreed to divide Jerusalem, including Old Jerusalem, and agreed to the division of sovereignty over the Temple Mount, but even Ehud Barak will admit to you today that there is no Palestinian leader in the world who could sign a state that covers 91% of the West Bank (and another 1 percent in a land swap) when a significant portion of this territory (the Jordan Valley) would also be leased to Israel for decades for security reasons.
I am not clearing Arafat of responsibility for the failure. He sat at Camp David with folded hands, passive and, above all, did not give any expression, neither at the conference nor after it, to the magnitude of the concession and the risk that Ehud Barak took on. It can be argued against Abu Mazen that he did not himself take care to correct the distortion, but one thing is clear – Abu Mazen was not the leader then and it is clear today that no Palestinian leader can sign such an agreement. In short, neither a shill nor a shoe.
From 2000 to 2008, no proposal was put to Abbas. During the second intifada, Abbas, with unprecedented courage, preached an end to acts of terrorism and violent resistance. When he took power, he also made sure of this, and we all, thanks in no small part to him, are enjoying relatively the quietest years in the territories and zero suicide attacks. I do not belittle the painful shooting attacks in the territories, but in numbers – look at the Shin Bet presentations – there have been no quieter years in terms of security in the territories since at least the first intifada, and Abbas receives almost zero credit for this in Israel. Wasn't this our first and last demand from the Palestinian leadership?
Even I'm tired of writing about Olmert and Levin's proposal. Here's an article I wrote in the past, and another and another. For those who don't have the strength, I'll remind you for the millionth time that Olmert's super-generous proposal - without cynicism - was given when he was a deposed prime minister, without political power and without legitimacy. At this point, President Bush and Secretary of State Rice had already told him themselves that no settlement would come from this proposal. Even leftists like me would have opposed the settlement if it had been signed at that time. It was the most undemocratic grab possible and it would have been rejected with contempt by our senior politicians (opposition chairman Netanyahu, who was already clear that his chances of being elected the next prime minister were high, announced in real time that he would not honor such an agreement, and Levin disavowed it). In short, there too, Abbas really didn't flinch, didn't run, didn't get scared, didn't dry up, and didn't give up.
Since 2008, no Israeli offer has ever been made. Maybe it really is time for Barnea, Shavit and Lapid to take a second look at the Israeli side. For five years, Netanyahu said – just let me get into the room with him, I will surprise him, I want an arrangement. I had no doubt that he had no surprises and this was yet another charlatan spin by Netanyahu. After all, nothing stopped him from sending a messenger to Muqta'a and saying – I am ready to give you Olmert's offer. Then we would see if Abbas was really a coward, a coward and a scoundrel. In the end, Abbas gave in. He knew that he would be worked on, that Netanyahu was not serious, but he said – at least I will accept prisoners. There were nine months of negotiations and guess what – Netanyahu didn't even make a territorial offer, refused to put a map, set security demands (Boogie Ya'alon presented) that were stricter than those presented by the same security establishment in the past, and about this behavior, Barnea writes that Netanyahu was more generous in this round. The man is simply twisting everyone around and our sharp, left-wing journalists are falling for the trap. Unbelievable.
It can be argued that the Palestinian price is an excessive price, that the State of Israel cannot pay it, that it poses too dangerous a threat to its existence. This is a legitimate and even weighty claim. Iran will take over the area, Qassams will hit Petah Tikva, etc. Personally, I think it is worth taking the risk because of a million and one other considerations, but that is not the argument. One thing cannot be argued – that when my son and I entered the room, they did not know what the Palestinian price was. If they knew that they had no intention of approaching him, then it is just a scam. When someone comes to buy an apartment and knows that the seller wants a million shekels, he does not offer half a million and he certainly does not have a million conversations with him when he refuses to name the price.
The saddest thing is that a politician who was decent until recently like Tzipi Livni, who in 2011 knew how to criticize Netanyahu's response to the Palestinian reconciliation agreement at the time, has become an embarrassing mouthpiece for that response today.
