Most importantly, the spin is rolling, we need to talk about January. We'll see the Chief of Staff (that's what, it turns out, the 'Chief of Staff', the head of the General Security Service, wants to be called, with resounding, of course, the 'Chief of Staff') prove that he said something about a 'war' in January.
It's not for nothing that the Prime Minister's Office has to work hard. There is a problem. They worked on the public, they worked on the media, and worst of all – they worked on the cabinet ministers.
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It's not for nothing that the IDF insists on arguing with the Shin Bet about what exactly was said in January of this year. It is much less comfortable talking about what was said in April. In April, everyone agrees that there was solid information that Hamas was planning a major attack, which could escalate into a confrontation, and that Hamas was preparing for such a confrontation.
Despite this information, the military continued to tell the public that Hamas was interested in a calm (for example, the Southern Command general that very month). The media – which is legitimate to mislead in such circumstances – was left with what they told the cabinet.
They convened the cabinet ministers in June about the kidnapping of the three boys, sold them a major arrest operation of Hamas members in the West Bank, including those released by Shalit, and only forgot to tell them that there was information that Hamas was planning a major attack, that the other side was preparing for a comprehensive confrontation, and perhaps it wasn't really wise to raise the level of tension now, instead of preparing for such a confrontation, or even - needless to mention - trying to prevent it.
To this day, the IDF insists that Hamas did not want the conflict, that it was dragged into it against its will. When you ask the IDF how this fits in with the information about the planning of a major terrorist attack, the answer is that if only we could show you the information that proves it.
Well, there are those who can see the information. The subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee is investigating Operation Protective Edge and is well aware of the difficult questions regarding the Prime Minister's conduct.
Naftali Bennett came to testify in the committee after sitting for hours in the Prime Minister's Office with the minutes of the Cabinet meetings from 'Protective Edge' and copying out precise quotes with dates. The Prime Minister probably hopes that Ze'ev Levin and Yariv Elkin will know how to play with this and silence Eitan Cabel, Ofer Shelah, Aryeh Deri and their committee members.
It is clear that such a media spin makes the Likudniks' job even harder. The minutes apparently prove that they really did not talk to this cabinet about attack tunnels from Gaza before Operation Protective Edge. When they did talk, they said that Hamas would be deterred from using them.
The comic relief in this story, almost as usual, is the State Comptroller, who, as usual, decided to 'check into' the matter.
What doesn't the State Comptroller investigate? He announced that he will investigate the expenses of the Prime Minister's House, and he will investigate the issue of public housing, the expropriation of El Al flight prices, the decision-making in Operation Protective Edge, Avigdor Lieberman's trip to Vienna, and in general, he 'investigates' anything that gets him a headline in the newspaper (except for the claim that Israel Hayom is a prohibited donation to Netanyahu. For some reason, the Comptroller doesn't want to investigate that, not even in the form of a headline in the newspaper).
The question marks over Netanyahu's decisions are, as mentioned, not simple: If the prime minister knew that there was a good chance that Hamas was leading to a conflict, why didn't he try to prevent it? Perhaps through the Palestinian reconciliation government, perhaps through Egypt, and if he wanted a conflict, why didn't he plan a surprise opening blow like the elimination of Jabari, instead of getting there through the arrest operation in the West Bank?
Furthermore, why were the localities' air defense units fired shortly before the conflict, and why was it necessary to "break through" one Iron Dome battery during Operation Protective Edge, in the absence of a sufficient number of such batteries?
•The article was published in Haaretz'
