The investigation into the failure in information security in the IDF before the October 7 massacre has been completed and will be presented in the coming days to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff.
According to a report by Nir Davuri on Channel 12, the investigation examined how Hamas managed to gather so much information about the IDF before the attack, and examined the manner in which the terrorist organization gathered the intelligence that allowed it to carry out the raid, attack, and massacre on the perimeter and IDF bases.
Dvori reports that the investigation - which is described as very sensitive, is mostly classified, and those who have been exposed to parts of it say that it is a penetrating investigation - reveals a difficult picture: "The investigation will lead to a dramatic change in the issue of information security and the way it is treated in the army.".
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Among other things, it was revealed that, contrary to the claims made, there was no "betrayal" within the ranks of the army, but Hamas gathered information through cyberattacks on many soldiers.
According to the report, in the two years preceding the attack, there was an attempt to hack into soldiers' mobile phones, in addition to attempts at seduction via social media. As part of the attempts to hack into soldiers' devices, Hamas made attempts to obtain phone numbers and through them access soldiers' correspondence that would provide it with intelligence.
In addition, the terrorist organization collected open information that soldiers uploaded to social media - valuable information, without censorship and without control, from bases and operational activity - and found weak points and targets that could be hit.
As part of the investigation, the IDF's supply chain was examined, and for example, if the IDF buys thousands of security cameras for its bases, made in China, there are those who know how to hack into them, use them, and collect a great deal of information through them.
Additionally, according to the investigation, deficiencies were found in the security of senior IDF officials and camps.
In addition, the investigation revealed that technical equipment purchased from outside the IDF was hacked. As part of the investigation, the IDF's supply chain was examined. For example, if the IDF buys thousands of security cameras for its bases, made in China, there are those who know how to hack into them, use them, and collect a great deal of information through them.
Now, the army requires organizational and cultural change to change this behavior.
