<\/p>\n\n\n\n
An audit report conducted even before the 'Iron Swords' War revealed gaps in the military's training, the authorization of reserve forces, and the defense infrastructure at the posts. The audit was conducted in the format of a one-day surprise audit, by four audit teams that visited 8 posts simultaneously. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The State Comptroller's Office published this afternoon (Tuesday) an audit report on the operational routine in border defense in the Northern Command, which was conducted even before the outbreak of the 'Iron Swords' War. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The audit, which took place on July 10, 2023, focused on examining the level of competence and operational readiness of posts and forces on the northern border line, and revealed significant gaps in border defense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman sharply criticized the situation: "The Simchat Torah massacre of October 7 resulted from numerous and serious failures in protecting the state's borders. In a surprise inspection, which we conducted at eight outposts even before October 7, we exposed serious failures and gaps in protecting the northern border. It was required that the report, which was submitted even before October 7 to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of Staff at the time, serve as a warning sign regarding the gaps and failures in protecting the state's borders.".<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The inspection was conducted in the format of a one-day surprise inspection, by four inspection teams that simultaneously visited 8 outposts out of all the routinely manned outposts. The mix of companies in the outposts inspected included infantry and armor forces, units in regular service and reserve service, some of which had just begun their operational employment period at the time of the inspection and some of which had been conducting operational employment for several weeks. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The draft report was sent to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the IDF for their comments, and the IDF's response was received on September 27, 2023, only about a week and a half before the outbreak of the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The report describes that in 2023, Hezbollah increased its activity near the border, openly and covertly, on a daily basis, including, among other things, carrying out terrorist attacks and establishing a chain of outposts near the border fence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
For example, on March 13, 2023, the organization infiltrated a terrorist into Israeli territory who planted an explosive device at the Megiddo junction that injured an Israeli citizen. During Passover on April 6, 2023, rockets were launched from southern Lebanon toward Israel, and on July 6, 2023, terrorist operatives launched an anti-tank missile from the Mount Dov area toward an IDF patrol vehicle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Among the key gaps revealed in the report: a limited presence of brigades and battalions on the northern border, while many operatives from Hezbollah's Radwan unit were routinely deployed in southern Lebanon across the border. In one case, it was discovered that a certain post on the Ramim ridge had only about 30 meters separating it from a Hezbollah outpost established across the way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The audit revealed significant gaps in training and certification: fighters from the Kfir Brigade had not undergone training with a specific weapon since their basic training, and a person in a certain post had not conducted shooting training with a specific weapon before entering the IDF. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Reserve soldiers at certain posts were also not authorized to fire certain weapons, and therefore were not equipped with these weapons as part of the training they perform, unlike the battalions in regular service.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the area of \u200b\u200binfrastructure and defense, the audit revealed that only parts of the 'Northern Shield' wall, which was intended to replace the outdated border fence, had been completed by June 2023. Also, at the posts inspected, some of the mounted patrols are carried out in unarmored vehicles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At one of the outposts, the vehicles were outdated with many malfunctions, which led to the cancellation of operational patrols, as also occurred at the time of the inspection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In conversations with the fighters, it emerged that they were familiar with the opening fire instructions in the sector, but they stated that in their opinion the level of actions required of them before the possibility of opening fire was not appropriate to the threat they faced. Commander of the Hiram Brigade noted that in June-July 2023, the opening fire instructions in the sector were examined and it was decided not to change them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Additionally, at certain posts, numerous alerts were received in the indicative fence, sometimes up to ten alerts per night. Each alert required the forces to arrive in the area to rule out enemy infiltration, which could erode the forces' level of readiness and alertness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The report notes that along the border with Lebanon, there are places where the barrels marking the border line are far apart, making it difficult to know exactly where the border line passes. This results in Hezbollah operatives and civilians approaching the area in a way that creates friction with IDF forces that are required to act to keep them away.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The audit also revealed that the posts on the Blue Line in the Hiram Military District are not equipped with certain security measures, even though these could improve the security of the post against attack. The Hiram Military District Commander told the audit team that according to the Military District Defense Order, the security of the post is based on the soldiers guarding it, and there is no directive requiring the installation of these measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Comptroller recommended, among other things, that the Prime Minister and the Political-Security Cabinet examine the implications of Lebanon's failure to comply with Security Council Resolution 1701; that the Chief of Staff examine the operational response required on the Blue Line in the face of the threats and security reality in the border area, and in doing so, the consistency between them and the existing order of forces and operational means; that the IDF's Military Operations and Operations Command re-examine the opening-of-fire orders among IDF forces operating in the northern border sector and the manner of their implementation; and that the Ground Forces (GAF) work to fill the shortages in training ammunition and ensure that fighters practice shooting in order to optimally prepare and train them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Engelman emphasized: "The events we have witnessed since the beginning of the war give the recommendations new validity and further emphasize the need for the IDF to immediately address the gaps that emerged in the audit.".<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The report had until now been under complete confidentiality imposed by the Knesset's State Audit Committee. Upon its approval to publish the report, the subcommittee decided not to place it in its entirety on the Knesset table but to publish only parts of it, in order to preserve state security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It should be noted that this review is no substitute for a comprehensive review that will examine in depth the events preceding the outbreak of the 'Iron Swords' War, including an examination of the activities of all levels of government and security apparatus bodies before the outbreak of the war, as well as during and after it.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"\u05d3\u05d5\u05d7 \u05d1\u05d9\u05e7\u05d5\u05e8\u05ea \u05e9\u05e0\u05e2\u05e8\u05db\u05d4 \u05e2\u05d5\u05d3 \u05dc\u05e4\u05e0\u05d9 \u05de\u05dc\u05d7\u05de\u05ea '\u05d7\u05e8\u05d1\u05d5\u05ea \u05d1\u05e8\u05d6\u05dc' \u05d7\u05e9\u05e3 \u05e4\u05e2\u05e8\u05d9\u05dd \u05d1\u05e1\u05d3\"\u05db, \u05d1\u05d0\u05d9\u05de\u05d5\u05e0\u05d9\u05dd, \u05d1\u05d4\u05e1\u05de\u05db\u05d5\u05ea \u05db\u05d5\u05d7\u05d5\u05ea \u05d4\u05de\u05d9\u05dc\u05d5\u05d0\u05d9\u05dd, \u05d5\u05d1\u05ea\u05e9\u05ea\u05d9\u05d5\u05ea \u05d4\u05d4\u05d2\u05e0\u05d4 \u05d1\u05de\u05d5\u05e6\u05d1\u05d9\u05dd \u2022 \u05d4\u05d1\u05d9\u05e7\u05d5\u05e8\u05ea \u05e0\u05e2\u05e8\u05db\u05d4 \u05d1\u05de\u05ea\u05db\u05d5\u05e0\u05ea \u05e9\u05dc \u05d1\u05d9\u05e7\u05d5\u05e8\u05ea \u05e4\u05ea\u05e2 \u05d7\u05d3-\u05d9\u05d5\u05de\u05d9\u05ea, \u05e2\u05dc \u05d9\u05d3\u05d9 \u05d0\u05e8\u05d1\u05e2\u05d4 \u05e6\u05d5\u05d5\u05ea\u05d9 \u05d1\u05d9\u05e7\u05d5\u05e8\u05ea \u05e9\u05d1\u05d9\u05e7\u05e8\u05d5 \u05d1\u05de\u05e7\u05d1\u05d9\u05dc \u05d1-8 \u05de\u05d5\u05e6\u05d1\u05d9\u05dd \u05de\u05e9\u05e8\u05d3 \u05de\u05d1\u05e7\u05e8 \u05d4\u05de\u05d3\u05d9\u05e0\u05d4 \u05e4\u05e8\u05e1\u05dd \u05d0\u05d7\u05e8 \u05d4\u05e6\u05d4\u05e8\u05d9\u05dd (\u05e9\u05dc\u05d9\u05e9\u05d9) \u05d3\u05d5\u05d7 \u05d1\u05d9\u05e7\u05d5\u05e8\u05ea \u05e2\u05dc \u05d4\u05e9\u05d2\u05e8\u05d4 \u05d4\u05de\u05d1\u05e6\u05e2\u05d9\u05ea \u05d1\u05d4\u05d2\u05e0\u05ea \u05d4\u05d2\u05d1\u05d5\u05dc \u05d1\u05e4\u05d9\u05e7\u05d5\u05d3 \u05d4\u05e6\u05e4\u05d5\u05df, \u05e9\u05e0\u05e2\u05e8\u05da \u05e2\u05d5\u05d3 \u05dc\u05e4\u05e0\u05d9 \u05e4\u05e8\u05d5\u05e5 […]","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":861887,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-973655","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-1"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n